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CONFLICTS - CHOICE OF LAW:

A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 101 S. Ct. 633 (1981)
Respondent's husband was killed in a motorcycle accident in Wisconsin.'
All of the parties involved in the accident were Wisconsin residents, 2 although
the deceased husband had worked in a nearby Minnesota city for the past
fifteen years. 3 Following the accident, respondent moved to Minnesota and
became a resident of that state. 4 Respondent then brought suit in Minnesota 5
to "stack" the $15,000 uninsured motorist coverage on each of her hubsand's
three cars for a total of $45,000.6 The stacking of insurance policies would have
been forbidden by Wisconsoin law.7 Petitioner, Allstate Insurance Company,
which carried on business in both Wisconsin and Minnesota,8 claimed Minnesota's contacts with the controversy were insignificant, 9 and therefore the Con1. Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 43, 44 (Minn. 1979). On July 1, 1974, Ralph
Hague was a passenger on a motorcycle owned and operated by his son, Ronald. The motorcycle was struck from behind by an automobile while stopped at an intersection. Id.
2. 101 S. Ct. 633, 636 (1981). The Hague family resided in Hager City, Wisconsin. The
accident occurred in Pierce County, Wisconsin, immediately across the border from Red
Wing, Minnesota.
3. Id. Mr. Hague was employed in Red Wing, Minnesota, which is one and one-half miles
from Hager City. See note 2 supra. The accident was in no way related to Mr. Hague's employment. Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 43, 44 (Minn. 1979).
4. 101 S. Ct. at 643. Lavinia Hague moved to Red Wing sometime after the accident;
however, the stipulated facts did riot reveal the date on which she moved.
5. Id. at 636. Suit was brought shortly after the Minnesota Registrar of Probate appointed Mrs. Hague representative of her late husband's estate. Mr. Hague's insurer, Allstate
Insurance Company, was sued directly because neither driver carried valid liability insurance.
Id. The record does not indicate why probate began in Minnesota, or whether probate had
also begun in Wisconsin. Brief for Petitioner at 6, 101 S. Ct. 633 (1981).
There was no question as to liability or the amount of damages. The only issue considered
was the amount of recovery, which turned on the choice of law decision. Hague v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 43, 45 (Minn. 1979).
6. Uninsured motorist coverage is usually provided in conjunction with other types of
coverage. Such coverage pays the insured all sums legally recoverable from the owner or
operator of another vehicle when that party does not have valid or sufficient liability insurance. See A. WILDNIss, A GUIDE TO UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE §§2.4-.11 (1969); Laufer,
A Dissent from the Uninsured Motorist Endorsement, 1969 DUKE L.J. 227, 236 (advocating the
elimination of uninsured motorist policies). Mr. Hague had a single policy with Allstate which
extended coverage to his three cars. A separate premium was paid for each car. Hague v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 43, 45 (Minn. 1979).
7. WIS, STAT. §204.30(5)(2) (1973). The Wisconsin supreme court in Nelson v. Employers
Mut. Cas. Co., 63 Wis. 2d 558, 217 N.W.2d 670 (1974), had construed the statute to prohibit
stacking. Although the statute had been amended and there was some question whether
stacking was still prohibited in Wisconsin, both the Minnesota supreme court and the United
States Supreme Court assumed the effect of the statute would still be the same. 289 N.W.2d
at 48 & n.8, 101 S. Ct. at 636 & n.6.
8. 101 S. Ct. at 653.
9. Examination of a state's contacts with a controversy for choice of law purposes is
often similar to the corresponding examination to determine jurisdiction. However, where
factual contacts with the forum state are the same, an interpretation of the contacts may
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stitution mandated the application of Wisconsin law.'0 The Minnesota Supreme Court determined that Minnesota law should be applied.- On certiorari,
the United States Supreme Court affirmed 12 and HELD, neither the due process
clause nor the full faith and credit clause i3 prohibits the application of Minnesota law, because Minnesota had a "significant aggregation of contacts with
the parties and the occurrence."'14
In early choice of law cases, courts frequently utilized the vested rights approach in deciding which state law was to be applied.5 Under this approach,
produce different conclusions for jurisdictional or choice of law issues. See, e.g., Kulko v.
Superior Court, 486 U.S. 84, 98 (1978) (jurisdiction not available in California, but California law "arguably might" apply). See also Martin, PersonalJurisdictionand Choice of Law,
78 MiCH. L. REv. 872 (1980) (urging that constitutional issues in both jurisdictional and
choice of law questions be determined by the same standard). See note 10 infra.
10. 101 S. Ct. at 636. The instant case deals only with "horizontal" choice of law issues,
i. e., determining which state's law should apply in resolving a controversy, and evaluating
constitutional limitations on that choice. See generally Muller-Freienfels, Conflicts of Law
and ConstitutionalLaw, 45 U. CH. L. REv. 598 (1978). See also R. WEiNTRAUB, COMMENTARY
ON THE CoNFucr oF LAws §10.9 (2d ed. 1980) (discussing conflicts between "federal interest"
and state law).
11. 289 N.W.2d 43 (Minn. 1979). The Minnesota trial Zourt found Wisconsin's antistacking rule "inimical to the public policy of Minnesota" and, therefore, granted summary
judgment for Mrs. Hague. Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co. (Hennepin County Dist. Ct., Minn.,
Apr. 21, 1977). The Minnesota supreme court affirmed the decision but not the reasoning of
the trial court. 289 N.W.2d 43 (Minn. 1979). The supreme court affirmed after considering
Professor Leflar's "choice influencing considerations" for choosing the appropriate state law
in a choice of law issue. See Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41
N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 267 (1966). Professor Leflar combined and systematized what he considered to
be the dominant factors examined in choice of law cases and espoused as important by writers
in the field. His list of five "choice influencing considerations" included: (1) predictability of
results; (2) maintenance of interstate and international order; (3)simplification of the
judicial task; (4) advancement of the forum's governmental interests; and (5) application of
the better rule of law. Id. at 282. See R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW §96 (3d ed. 1977).
See note 63 and accompanying text, infra. The Minnesota supreme court found Professor
Leflar's fifth factor applicable and determined Minnesota's law permitting stacking was a
better rule of law than the Wisconsin prohibition. 289 N.W.2d at 43.
12. 101 S.Ct. 633. The Court did not consider the propriety of Professor Leflar's
methodology, but merely determined Minnesota's choice of law decision, on whatever basis,
was constitutionally permissible. The Court suggested it did not agree with Minnesota's
analysis, but noted that the choice was not necessarily unconstitutional. Id. at 637.
13. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV; id. art. IV, §1. The instant case and the line of cases that
precede it dealt only with the due process clause and the full faith and credit clause. The
Constitution, however, contains other provisions which may restrict choice of law decisions.
See id. art. IV, §2 (privileges and immunities); id. amend. XIV (equal protection). See also
R. LERLAR, supra note 11, §5; R. WErmTAu, supra note 10, §9.1.
14. 101 S. Ct. at 644.
15. See R. LEFAR, supra note 11, §87, at 174. Before the development of conflicts law, the
law of a foreign state would be given effect only because of comity among the states. See
A. EIRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws §3 (1962); J. STORY, CoMMENTARIES ON
THE CoNFIcr OF LAws 24 (1834). For a critical commentary of Justice Story's work, see
Lorenzen, Story's Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws - One Hundred Years After, 48 HARv.
L. RV. 15 (1934). The first well-known supporter of the vested rights approach was Joseph
Beale, reporter of the first Restatement of Conflicts. See J. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLIcrs OF LAws (1935); Beale, What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract, 23 HA-v. L. REv.
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each area of substantive law was identified with a single significant event that
would resolve the choice of law issue. 16 Courts would then apply the law of the
state where this event occurred because the rights of the parties were considered
to have vested in that state.' 7 For example, the choice of law rule in torts was
lex loci delicti - that is, liability was determined by the law of the place of the
wrong.' In contract disputes, the rule was lex loci contractus, meaning that the
validity of the contract was governed by the law of the place where the contract
was made.' 9 The entire choice of law process was, therefore, reduced to a
mechanical characterization of the action and an evaluation of the facts using
20
the appropriate rule.
Although the vested rights approach appeared to offer uniformity and predictability in resolving choice of law issues, it was nevertheless subject to
constitutional limitation.2 1 For example, in New York Life Insurance Co.
v. Dodge,22 the United States Supreme Court recognized that the fourteenth
amendment prohibited Missouri from applying its non-forfeiture statute 23 to
invalidate a forfeiture clause in a New York loan contract. The contract in that
case was secured by the cash value of the borrower's life insurance policy. The
underlying policy was purchased in Missouri and was considered a Missouri
contract. The loan agreement authorized by the policy, however, was applied

260 (1910). For a concise history of varying approaches to choice of law analysis, see generally
D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS 1-18 (1965). See also R. MINOR, CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1901) (a vested rights approach predating Beale's analysis).
16. R. LEFLAR, supra note II, §86. The function of conflicts law was to evaluate the
nature of each type of legal claim or transaction to determine what factor should be the basis
for a choice of law decision. Id.
17. Id. See also A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 15, §4 (vested rights analysis fails as a "super
law").
18. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, §377 (1934); 2 J. BEALE, supra note 15, §378.1
(a recovery in tort is dependent upon the law of the place where the tort was committed).
19. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 26, §344; 2 J. BEALE, supra note 15, §332.4 (there is no
law, other than that of the place of contracting, which can annex to a contract a legal obligation). See generally J. BEALE, CASES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1902).
20. R. LEFLAR, supra note 11, §87, at 174. Characterization refers to the process of determining the nature of an issue before a court, which would thereby indicate the appropriate
rule to be applied. If each court properly characterized the action before it and properly
looked up the corresponding rule, then there would be perfect uniformity and predictability of results. Id. Unfortunately, this goal was never achieved, because the characterization
process became a tool through which courts could control the outcome of a controversy.
21. See note 13 supra.
22. 246 U.S. 357 (1918). This case is an example of the problems in achieving the uniformity and predictability sought with the vested rights approach. Although both the Springfield Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court employed a vested rights approach, the two courts reached different conclusions concerning the nature of the obligations
of the parties. Id. See note 20 supra.
23. Mo. REV. STAT. §7897 (1899). The result under Missouri's non-forfeiture statute was
that three-fourths of the surrender value of the policy, at the time a premium was first
missed, less any outstanding indebtedness, would be used to purchase a term insurance policy
in the amount of the original whole life policy, so that the same amount of coverage would
remain available, but for a shorter time. Application of this formula would have left the
policy in force at the time of Mr. Dodge's death. 246 U.S. at 367.
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for and received from the company's home office in New York 24 and was, therefore, deemed a New York contract. 2s The Court noted that Missouri could not
infringe upon the right of its citizens to contract outside of the state. 28 Consequently, application of Missouri's non-forfeiture statute to the otherwise-valid
New York contract constituted an impairment of the liberty of contract guar27
anteed by the fourteenth amendment.
2s
In Home Insurance Co. v. Dick the Supreme Court similarly demonstrated
that a state could not constitutionally undermine contracts made in other
jurisdictions. In Dick, a Texas citizen who resided in Mexico became an assignee on an insurance policy which was made in Mexico and expressly
subject to Mexican law.29 Consistent with Mexican standards, the policy required that any action on a loss be brought within one year. When a loss occurred, the assignee brought suit in a Texas court against the Mexican and
New York insurers, even though the action was brought more than a year after
the loss.2 0 The Texas court characterized al the one-year clause in the insurance
policy as relating to remedy rather than substance. Consequently, the Texas

24. 246 U.S. at 868. Josiah Dodge purchased a whole life insurance policy which provided
that loans could be "obtained" at the home office. This language indicated that the making of
a loan was optional on the part of the company and therefore not part of the original agreement. The language also suggested if a loan were made it would be made at the home office
in New York. The loan contract provided that if a premium installment were missed, the
loan would be accelerated and both it and the missed premium would be paid by the cash
value of the policy. When Mr. Dodge died, the policy was cancelled because the loan was
accelerated and combined with the policy's reduced cash value to cover missed premiums.
This arrangement was valid under New York law. Id.
25. 246 U.S. at 373, 377. Because it was a New York contract, Missouri could exercise no
control over its obligations.
26. Id. at 876-77.
27. Id. at 877. See also Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Liebing, 259 U.S. 209 (1922). The Liebing
facts paralleled those in Dodge, except that the policy loan was not considered optional.
Therefore, the loan was part of the original contract, and Missouri could apply its own law.
The Liebing Court stated that "the Constitution and first principles of legal thinking allow
the law of the place where a contract is made to determine the validity and the consequences
of the act." Id. at 214. Nevertheless, it has been suggested that the word "allow" is the key to
interpretation here, because the reasoning was used only to sustain a previous judgment. See
Freund, Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59 HAxv. L. REv. 1210, 1234-85 (1946).
28. 281 U.S. 897 (1930).
29. Id. at 403. The policy was originally purchased by a Mexican domiciliary.
30. Id. at 402. Article 1043 of the Commercial Code of Mexico limited the period for
enforcement of a cause of action arising out of an insurance contract to one year. Id. at 403
n.l.
The original action was brought against the Mexican insurer, but jurisdiction was not
obtainable over the foreign corporation because it did no business in Texas. Home Insurance
Co. and Franklin Fire Insurance Co., which reinsured the original obligation of the Mexican
insurer, were brought in on ancillary writs served on their agents in Texas, garnishing their
alleged debts to the Mexican insurer. Id. at 402. The reinsurance obligations were made with
the New York offices of the reinsurers through their agents in Mexico City. The Texas agents
were not involved in the transaction. Dick v. Compania General Anglo-Mexicana de Seguros,
No. 89643 (Galveston County Dist. Ct., Texas, July 26, 1927).
81. See note 20 and accompanying text, supra.
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court applied a contrary statutory provision 32 to invalidate the clause because
33
under vested rights analysis the forum was to apply its own procedural law.
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding Texas' attempt to alter the
terms of the contract by applying its own law violated principles of constitutional due process. 3 4 The Court noted that all of the acts relating to the making
of the insurance policy took place in Mexico. In particular, the policy was
originally issued in Mexico by a Mexican insurer to a Mexican citizen, and the
35
vessel insured by the policy was covered only when in Mexican waters. In
addition to these traditional vested rights considerations, however, the Court
also considered the relationship between Texas and the other events involved
in the suit.36 For example, the Court stated that the assignee's Texas domicile
was "without significance," since he was living in Mexico when the policy was
issued and when the loss occurred. 37 Apparently, the fact that the assignee's coplaintiffs were incorporated in Texas and the insurer had business activities in
Texas were also deemed insignificant factors. 38 Nevertheless, by considering
the Texas contacts, the Dick court implied that when evaluating a choice of
law question, considerations unrelated to a vested rights analysis might be constitutionally significant.8 9
In Alaska Packers Association v. Industrial Accident Commission,4" the
Court held California did not violate the due process or full faith and credit
clauses by refusing to apply Alaska law to a contractual claim. 41 In Alaska
Packers, an employee who executed a contract for employment in California
was injured while working under contract in Alaska.4- The employment con32. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 5545 (1925). Texas law voided any agreement limiting the
time to sue to less than two years.
33. See RESTATEMENT OF CONk IcT OF LAWS §585 (1934); R. LEFLAR, supra note 11, §86.
34. 281U.S.at4Il.
35. Id.
36. See id. at 408. "All acts relating to the making of the policy were done in Mexico. All
in relation to the making of the contracts of reinsurance were done there or in New York." Id.
37. Id. It is not clear from the records how long Dick had been in Mexico at the time of
the loss.
38. Texas & Gulf Steamship Co. and Suderman & Young, Inc., both Texas corporations,
intervened as co-plaintiffs. Each had an interest in the tug being insured and were beneficiaries
under the insurance policy. Id. at 403 n.2; Order Granting Tex. &cGulf S.S. Co. & Suderman
&cYoung Leave to Intervene for Their Interest, Dick v. Compania General Anglo-Mexicana
de Seguros, No. 39643 (Galveston County Dist. Ct., Texas, July 26, 1927).
39. See Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313, 316 (1943) (referring to the
problems that arose when courts previously "became involved by conceptualistic discussion of
theories of the place of contracting or of performance"). See also 101 S. Ct. at 641 n.21, 642
n.22. The Court referred to the "hoary rule of lex loci contractus" and the "wooden lex loci
delicti doctrine." Id.
40. 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
41. The Court was concerned not with any particular approach a state might use in
making choice of law decisions, but only with the constitutionality of the ultimate result. See
note 12 supra.
42. The appellee was hired ii, San Francisco to work in Alaska. The employer was to
provide transportation to and from Alaska with wages paid after appellee returned to California. The Court stressed that given this arrangement, appellee was left with a choice between remaining without pay in Alaska to bring suit, or returning to California, where xecovery was prohibited by the contract. 294 U.S. at 542.
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tract expressly provided that the parties would be bound by Alaska's workman's compensation statutes. Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court upheld an award based on California law. 43 The United States Supreme Court
affirmed and held the due process clause did not prohibit California from applying its own workman's compensation law- so long as it had a legitimate
interest in the outcome of the litigation and did not exercise its control in an
arbitrary or unreasonable manner. 45 Even if a contract was to be wholly performed elsewhere, the state in which the contract was made may have interests
in the transaction sufficient to justify the exercise of legislative control.4 In
examining the factual situation, the Court found that California had legitimate
and important interests in providing remedies for employees within its borders,
and in avoiding the addition of injured workers to its welfare rolls. 47 Since
Alaska's interests in the litigation were not shown to be superior to California's,
the full faith and credit clause 48 did not require that Alaska's statutes be given
49

effect.
Despite the seemingly flexible approach of Alaska Packers, the Supreme
Court subsequently found a violation of the full faith and credit clause in John
Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Yates.60 The respondent's husband pur43. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, I Cal. 2d 250, 34 P.2d 716 (1934).
44. 1917 CAL. STATS. ch. 586, §58. The California law made itself available to all employed in the state, whether actually working in the state or not. 294 U.S. at 538. The California Supreme Court had held in Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 184
Cal. 26, 192 P. 1021 (1921), writ of error dismissed, 255 U.S. 445 (1921), that the statute applied to nonresidents as well as to residents. Factually similar to Alaska Packers, Quong involved the same company and a similar employment contract. In Quong, discrimination
against nonresidents was prohibited by the privileges and immunities clause of the Constitution.
The California Supreme Court used a vested rights approach and applied its own law to
the California employment contract. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 1
Cal. 2d 250, 34 P.2d 716 (1934). The United States Supreme Court chose to affirm on a different basis. 294 U.S. at 532.
45. 294 U.S. at 541-42. The Alaska Packers Court utilized a dual standard, treating the
due process clause separately from the full faith and credit clause.
- 46. Id. at 540-41. This statement could be explained as a vested rights approach, in spite
of the Court's discussion of California's interests in the controversy. The argument that the
Court was merely couching a vested rights approach in other terms is supported by the
Court's emphasis on the contractual character of the action. The Court also noted that
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542, 547 (1914) had held that a state may not
control the consequences of a tort committed elsewhere. (The Western Union case was an
action seeking damages for mental anguish arising out of a failure to forward a telegram. The
applicable law was the law of the place where negligence occurred).
47. 294 U.S. at 542-43. Support for the view that the Court was not using a vested rights
approach is found in the Court's implication that the case might have a different result if
California had a "lesser interest" in protecting the employee. Id. at 543.
48. Id. at 547-48. The full faith and credit clause comes into play when there are conflicting statutes. The Court pointed out that a lower requirement for a successful full faith
and credit challenge, with stricter enforcement of the clause, "would lead to the absurd result that, wherever the conflict arises, the statute of each must be enforced in the courts of
the other, but cannot be in its own." Id. at 547.
49. Id. at 550.
50. 299 US. 178 (1936).
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chased a life insurance policy which was applied for, issued, and delivered in
New York.51 In applying for the policy, the husband had made misrepresentations concerning his health -2 which would have voided the policy under New
York law.63 Following her husband's death, respondent moved to Georgia and
brought suit to collect on the life insurance policy. 54 The Georgia supreme
court held it was not required to apply the New York statute invalidating the
insurance policy. 5 The United States Supreme Court reversed, and held that
by making the contract in New York, the parties became subject to the conditions set out by New York statutes. 56 Moreover, the Court recognized the complete absence of Georgia's interest in the controversy.57 Therefore, the full faith
and credit clause required Georgia to give effect to the New York statute. 8
Like previous decisions, the Yates court examined factors other then the traditional vested rights consideration of where the contract was made. It is not
clear, however, whether the court based its decision on the Alaska Packers'
"legitimate interest" analysis.
Despite the Supreme Court's apparent expansion of the vested rights approach, courts and commentators became increasingly critical of the utility of
the approach in choice of law analysis. 59 The vested rights system was con-

sidered overly technical and rigid and therefore conducive to producing un51. Id. at 179.
52. Id. at 179-81. Mr. and Mrs. Yates had been living in New York. When Mr. Yates
purchased the policy, he stated he was in good health and not under the care of a physician.
However, Mr. Yates had been receiving treatment for cancer at the time the policy was purchased. Mr. Yates died the following month and his widow moved to Georgia. Id.
53. 1930 N.Y. Laws, ch. 30, §58. New York law provided that the entire agreement had to
be embodied within the policy, that it was the insured's responsibility to see that all of his
statements were reflected properly, and that if the policy showed a material misrepresentation
by the insured, there could be no recovery even if the insured could prove that correct
answers were given to the examiner. Id.
54. 299 U.S. at 179.
55. Id. at 181. The Georgia courts characterized the issue of the effect of the false statements as procedural, holding that the law of the forum should therefore apply. Georgia law
would have permitted the admission of evidence tending to show that the policy did not accurately reflect the statements of Mr. Yates. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 182
Ga. 213, 185 S.E. 268 (1935).
56. 299 U.S. at 182. This is evidently a vested rights type of approach. It is not clear,
however, whether the Court in basing its decision on the full faith and credit clause was
applying an Alaska Packers-type analysis. The Alaska Packers decision could possibly be explained in terms of the older vested rights theory, even though the Court referred to a weigh.
ing of interests. See notes 15-18 and accompanying text, supra. Therefore, it is not clear
whether the Alaska Packers case represents a shift in the Court's attitude.
57. 299 U.S. at 182. There was "no occurrence, [and] nothing done to which Georgia law
could apply." Id. This seems to be an examination of forum interests in the controversy.
58. Id. at 178. There was no discussion of whether concern for the possibility of forum
shopping entered into the decision. See note 84 infra.
59. See, e.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963)
(rejection of the vested rights approach in favor of interest analysis). See also Richards v.
United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1962) (discussing trend toward interest analysis in state
courts). See generally Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HJsiv. L. REV.
173, 178 (1933) (criticizing the traditional vested rights approach as tending towards choosing
a jurisdiction rather than an appropriate decisional norm).
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fair judgments.60 To avoid these harsh results, courts often resorted to "escape
devices" such as recharacterization of the action. 6' In addition, commentators
began advocating an alternative approach known as interest analysis. This
theory supported the application of the law of the jurisdiction with the stronger
interest in the controversy. 62 Professor Leflar, a renowned scholar in the area,
proposed five "choice-influencing considerations" to be used in making the
choice of law decision.63 Similarly, the Second Restatement adopted a "most
significant relationship" test, which would theoretically result in an interest

weighing methodology.64
Although the Supreme Court had not expressly addressed the constitutionality of the interest weighing approach, the analysis applied in its previous decisions transferred readily to this new trend in conflicts of law theories.65 For
example, in Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 66 the Supreme Court
affirmed the District of Columbia's interest analysis approach in choosing to
apply the forum's workman's compensation statute. In Cardillo, a resident of
the District of Columbia was accidentally killed in Virginia while returning
home from his Virginia job site.67 The Court held the District of Columbia
could constitutionally apply its own law because it had important interests in
providing workman's compensation for its residents regardless of the place of

employment or location of death.68
60. See Lorenzen, Territoriality,Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33 YA.

L.J. 786

(1924).
61. An "escape device" is a process whereby a court manipulates the choice of law rules
to achieve a desired result. See R. LErrLR, supra note 11, §88. Compare Dyke v. Erie Ry., 45
N.Y. 113, 6Am. R. 43 (1871) with Pittsburgh, C.C. &St. L. Ry. v. Groin, 142 Ky. 51, 133 S.W.
977 (1911). Both cases involved a rail passenger travelling between two points within a state,
who was injured en route to his destination, but nevertheless out-of-state. Dyke characterized
the action as related to the New York contract for transportation; the latter characterized it
as a tort action under the foreign state's law. See generally Lorenzen, The Qualification,Classi.
fication, or CharacterizationProblem in the Conflict of Laws, 50 YALE L.J. 743 (1941).
62. Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the
judicial Function, 26 U. Cm. L. Rv. 9, 10-11 (1958). See also Currie, Notes on Methods and
Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 Duan L.J. 171. Professor Brainerd Currie supported
the use of the forum's own law unless it had absolutely no governmental interest in the controversy. Id. at 178. See also Ehrenzweig, The Lex Fori -Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws,
58 MicH. L. REv. 637 (1960) (supporting application of the law of the forum, but not to the
same extent as Currie).
63. See R. LErrAR, supra note 11, §86. See also Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applic.
able Law, 52 CoinUm. L. REv. 959 (1952) (list of nine "policies" to be considered in choice of
law analysis); Yntema, The Objectives of Private International Law, 35 CAN. B. Rm. 721,
734-35 (1957) (a list of seventeen "objectives" in choice of law analysis).
64. See RESTATEImEN (SECOND) or CoN-ucrs or LAws §§1, 2, 6 (1971); R. Lm'wt, supra
note 17, §91, at 184.
65. See text accompanying notes 22-59 supra.
66. 330 U.S. 469 (1947).
67. Id. at 471-72. The employee was a District of Columbia resident who was hired at his
employer's place of business in the District of Columbia. His transportation costs were paid
by the employer. The District of Columbia workmen's compensation law, 33 U.S.C. §§919(a),
921(b) (1976), was applicable only if death arose out of the course of his employment.
68. 330 U.S. at 476.
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The Court further relaxed choice of law standards in Watson v. Employers
Liability Assurance Association."9 The Louisiana plaintiff in that case brought
suit to collect on an out-of-state insurance policy.70 The Court allowed the
plaintiff to bring a direct action under a special Louisiana law, even though
the action could not have been brought in the state where the policy was
made. 7' In examining Louisiana's interest in the litigation, the Court modified
the Alaska Packers "legitimate interest" approach by holding that even where
the forum's interests are less significant than those of another state, the forum
may still constitutionally apply its own law if it has a legitimate interest in the
subject of the controversy.7 2 Consequently, the issue in choice of law decisions
was no longer which state had the strongest interests in a controversy, but
whether a given state's interests were significant enough to meet the threshold
73
level required to satisfy the Constitution.
In the instant case, the Court considered the Minnesota contacts involved
in the insurance litigation sufficient to constitutionally justify the application
of Minnesota law. 74 The plurality stated that in order to be constitutionally
permissible, the state must have a "significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts" such that the choice of its law would not be arbitrary or
fundamentally unfair. 7 5 Consequently, the Dick and Yates decisions were distinguished from the instant case because in those cases the contacts with the
forum were insignificant.76 The instant plurality, however, noted similarities
to the Alaska Packers and Cardillo decisions, where adequate contacts were
found to sustain the forum's law. 77 The plurality7s described three Minnesota
69. 348 U.s. 66 (1954).
70. Id. at 67-70. Employers Liability had insured the Toni company against liability
arising out of consumer use of Toni's home permanent kit. The policy contained a clause
prohibiting direct action against the insurer prior to a final determination of Toni's liability.
This clause was valid in both Massachusetts and Illinois, where the contract had been
negotiated and issued and was to be wholly performed. Mrs. Watson, a Louisiana resident
who was injured while using the product, brought suit under Louisiana's direct action statute.
LA. R.v. STAT. ANN. §§22:655, :983 (1950). The Court held that where a contract may affect
persons in more than one state, each state may be permitted to enforce its own contract
policies to protect its own interests. 348 U.S. at 67-70.
71. 348 U.S. at 67-70.

72. Id. at 72.
73. E.g., Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955) (application of Arkansas law upheld
against full faith and credit challenge, where the injured employee was domiciled and employed in Missouri but was injured in Arkansas, even though he had no creditors in Arkansas
and no chance of becoming a public charge of Arkansas). See also Pacific Employers Ins. Co.
v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
74, 101 S. Ct. at 639.
75. Id. at 640.
76. Id. at 639. "Dick and Yates stand for the proposition that if a State has only an insignificant contact with the parties and the occurrence or transaction, application of its law
is unconstitutional." Id.
77. Id. at 640.
78. Justice Brennan announced the judgment of the Court in an opinion in which
Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun joined. Justice Stevens concurred in a separate
opinion. Justice Powell dissented in an opinion in which Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist joined. Justice Stewart took no part in the decision.
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contacts as "obviously significant": the deceased husband's employment, Allstate's business activities, and the respondent's new residence. 7o
In examining these three factors, the Court conceded that employment

status is not as substantial a contact as residenceso Nevertheless, because respondent's husband had worked in Minnesota for fifteen years, Minnesota had
important state interests in the controversy. In particular, Minnesota had an
interest in the well-being of its work force, in the vindication of the estate of
one of its employees,)" and in the protection of commuters who regularly use
its services and facilities.8 2 The Court also found Allstate's business activity
within the forum to be a relevant contact. Allstate's presence indicated a presumed familiarity with Minnesota law, and an awareness of the possibility of
defending a lawsuit there8 3 In addition, the Court considered the respondent's
Minnesota residence as relevant, although the Court noted that her postoccurrence move would not in itself have been sufficient to justify application
of Minnesota law.8 4 The Court emphasized that unlike the Yates situation, the
post-occurrence move did not appear to be the product of forum shopping.85
Moreover, Minnesota had an interest in protecting the rights of the respondent
not only as a state citizen, but as the representative of a deceased worker's
estate.8 6 The Court concluded that Minnesota had a "significant aggregation
of contacts" with the controversy, so that application of Minnesota law could
not be considered arbitrary or fundamentally unfair.8 7 Consequently, the choice
of Minnesota law by the Minnesota courts did not exceed constitutional limitations.8 8
79. Id. at 639.
80. Id. at 640. "[E]mployment status may implicate a state interest less substantial than
does resident status." Id. The Watson rule suggests that it is not necessary that a state have
stronger interests, but only legitimate interests.
81. Id. at 640-42. The Court elaborated on the interrelationship between harm to an
individual employee and the resultant weakening of the workforce and burden on the industry. But see id. at 654 (Powell, J., dissenting) (the plurality's opinion is "understandably
vague" on this point).
82. Id. at 641. The Court did not explain whether it was implying some greater forum
interest in protecting workers, as opposed to the unemployed, vacationers, and others who
might use state facilities. See id. at 654 (Powell, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 642-43. See Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd, 363 U.S. 207, 221 (1960) (Black, 3.,
dissenting) (loss occurred in Florida covered by "world wide" property coverage, purchased
in Illinois; insurer, doing business in Florida, knew it was subject to suit there).
84. 101 S. Ct. at 643. This proposition was derived from Dick and Yates. See notes 37,
52, &76 and accompanying text, supra.

85. 101 S.Ct. at 643. But see id. at 653 (Powell, J., dissenting) (the decision encourages
forum shopping).
86. Id. at 643-44. Because Mrs. Hague had become a resident, the state had an interest in
assuring her recovery as a resident accident "victim" and in preventing her from becoming a
public charge.
87. Id. at 644. "Significant aggregation of contacts" appears to be a new concept in
choice of law analysis. In failing to use the previous standard of a significant contact, the
Court implied that each of the contacts in the instant case, standing alone, would be insignificant.
88. Id. at 633. Justice Stevens' concurring opinion treated the full faith and credit question
separately from the due process issue. Id. at 644. Justice Stevens first determined that as a
matter of policy, Minnesota's choice of its own law was plainly unsound. Nevertheless, the
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Justice Powell's dissent accepted the basic decisional framework set out by
89
the plurality, but disagreed with the plurality's evaluation of the facts. Powell
stated a forum state must have significant contacts with the litigation and a
legitimate interest in the controversy in order to constitutionally apply its own
law. A state has a legitimate interest, however, only if there is a reasonable
9
nexus between the litigation and the state's public policy. 0 Justice Powell
concluded that Minnesota's contacts with the controversy were either trivial or
irrelevant to any state public policy, 91 and were, therefore, constitutionally insignificant.
The instant plurality indicated that its opinion did no more than evaluate
the facts by using an interest-weighing standard logically deduced from past
decisions. 92 This new guideline was similar to standards expressed in the
previous Supreme Court decisions.93 In fact, the instant Court's "significant
aggregation" test could probably have been used in Dick, Yates, and the other
precedents relied upon by the Court without changing the outcome of those
cases. 94 Nevertheless, the newly-articulated rule represents a much more permissive standard for choice of law analysis. For example, the instant Court's
rule does not seem to contain any vestige of the Dodge Court's concern

full faith and credit clause was not implicated because Minnesota's choice of law decision
posed no threat to either Wisconsin's sovereignty or to national unity. Justice Stevens also
asserted that Allstate's due process rights were not infringed because the application of
Minnesota law was neither arbitrary nor unfair. In this regard, the Justice supported a
presumption in favor of the forum's law. Id. at 647. From a constitutional standpoint,
Stevens declared that all contacts except Allstate's presence in the forum state were irrelevant. Id. at 649-50. Furthermore, Justice Stevens asserted that Mrs. Hague's post-accident
move and the decedent's employment in Minnesota actually undermined the plurality's conclusion. Because Allstate conducted business in Minnesota, there would be no fundamental
unfairness in subjecting Allstate to Minnesota insurance laws. Id. at 648-50. Stevens implied
that his view of the case would have been different had there been an express indication of
the expectation of the parties. But see, e.g., Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964)
(Florida's choice of law resulted in the overriding of a contractual limitation period). Justice
Stevens' opinion seems to indicate that he favors the interest-weighing approach in full faith
and credit analysis and a focus on the defendant's expectations in the due process analysis.
89. 101 S. Ct. at 650. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist joined in Powell's
opinion. Justice Powell's reasoning parallels that of the plurality, but, in his view, the "significant aggregation" standard applied to the facts at hand produces a different result.
90. Id. at 654. Justice Powell believed Minnesota did not have a legitimate interest in
the controversy.

91.

Id. at 653. See note 16 supra. Justice Powell also discussed the reasonable expectations

of the parties. The contacts between a state and a controversy must not be so "slight and too

casual" that it is fundamentally unfair for the forum to apply its own law. Clay v. Sun Ins.
Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179, 182 (1964). Here, however, Justice Powell found the expectations
of the parties were not frustrated. 101 S.Ct. at 652.
92. 101 S.Ct. at 640.
93.

See notes 45, 57, 68 & 72 and accompanying text, supra.

94. For example, the "significant aggregation" standard could probably have been used
by the Dick court to produce the same result. It is the application of this standard which

marks a new direction in the court's philosophy in choice of law issues. The change has been
effected by presenting the facts of previous cases in a manner that leaves the instant court
with a deceptively simplistic conclusion.
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for the parties' freedom to contract. 5 Moreover, while this rule superficially
resembles the Alaska Packers"legitimate interest" test, as modified by Watson,90
the instant Court's treatment of the new test indicates a more liberal attitude
in determining state interest.
The impact of the instant decision derives from the Court's application of
the standard rather than the language of the standard itself. Although four of
the eight justices participating in the decision found Minnesota's interest in
the litigation either trivial or irrelevant, 7 the plurality found the three forum
contacts "obviously significant. '"8 However, by elevating to constitutional significance these previously unimportant contacts, the Court may have effectively
created an entirely new constitutional framework to evaluate choice of law
problems. 9 Relying on Cardillo,the plurality seemed to stretch the single fact
of the deceased husband's Minnesota employment by restating the importance
of that contact in several different ways. The forum, therefore, appeared to
have numerous interests arising out of that one contact. 10° In Cardillo,however,
the District of Columbia's contacts with the parties and the occurrence were
superior to the instant case. The Cardillo decedent's regular commute from the
District of Columbia to Virginia was important primarily to show that the
death arose out of the course of employment. Moreover, the decedent's employer
was also a resident of the forum state. 101
The instant Court's reliance on employment as an important contact is
also troublesome in light of the Dick decision. The Dick Court determined
that the assignee's Texas residence was "without significance" with regard to
the Mexican insurance policy.1 0 2 The instant plurality, however, stated that
employment may be a less substantial contact than residence.103 It is, therefore,
difficult to reconcile the Dick decision with the Court's subsequent determina-

tion that the decedent's Minnesota employment represents a significant contact.
Minnesota's second contact, Allstate's business activities, gave the forum an
interest in regulating the insurance company's obligations. The company was
also deemed have known the forum's law, and therefore, expect that it might
95. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
96. See text accompanying notes 72-73 supra.
97. Justice Stevens in his concurrence, and Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Powell
and Rehnquist, in dissent, found Minnesota's contacts with the controversy irrelevant. See
notes 88 &91 supra.
98. 101 S.Ct. at 639.
99. Many authorities have long considered Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930), to
be a leading case exhibiting the constitutional limits on choice of law. See, e.g., Weintraub,
Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Limitations on a State's Choice of Law, 44 IowA L.

Rav. 449,454 (1959).
100. 101 S.Ct. at 640-42. See id. at 654 (Powell, J., dissenting).
101. The employee's commuting expenses were also paid by the employer, and the commuting was important only to show that death arose out of the course of employment. See
Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U.S. at 471-72.
102. 281 U.S. at 408. The instant Court referred to the assignee as being "domiciled" in
Mexico. 101 S.Ct. at 638. It is not clear, however, what distinction, if any, the Court was
making between domicile and residence.
103. 101. S.Ct. at 640.
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be subject to suit there. 04 The Court failed, however, to satisfactorily explain
why this business contact was considered significant where similar contacts
were deemed insignificant in Dick and Yates.' 05 Neither of these two cases attributed significance to the defendant insurance company's presence in the
forum state. Moreover, the Dick Court did not seem to attach importance to the
defendant insurance company's business in Texas. 106 Therefore, it is difficult to
distinguish the Dick defendant's expectation of being sued in Texas from the
°7
instant defendant's expectation of being sued in Minnesota."
The plurality also relied on the respondent's Minnesota residence. The
respondent moved to the forum state after the loss of her husband, and then
brought suit after she established residence. It is difficult to understand the
instant Court's treatment of the respondent's move in light of the Court's
previous decisions in Dick and Yates. The assignee in Dick returned to Texas
only ten days after his loss and was at all times a permanent resident of the
forum state.'08 In addition, the assignee's co-plaintiffs were Texas corporations
which were present and doing business in Texas. 0 9 Yet, despite the assignee's
apparent presence in Texas, the Court refused to allow Texas to apply its own
laws. The instant Court also pointed out that Yates established that the postoccurrence change of residence was insufficient of itself to allow a forum to
apply its own law, but stated that Yates did not hold that a change of residence
was irrelevant.1"° However, a contrary interpretation of the Yates decision
would seem to follow since the Yates Court characterized the post-occurrence as
a move "without significance," and could find "no occurrence" to which the
forum's law could apply"'
In reaching its decision, the plurality considered potential violations of both
104. Id. at 642-43. All of the justices participating in the decision agreed that Allstate's
expectations were not so frustrated that there was a deprivation of due process. See note 91
supra.
105. See note 76 supra.
106. The presence of the defendants in Dick and Yates in the forum state was not expressly declared insignificant in either case. Nevertheless, it is difficult to reach any other
conclusion in light of the Court's failure to attach significance to the presence, combined
with the discussions of the absence of contacts in each case.
107. Home Insurance Company may not have expected to be sued more than a year after
the insured tug was destroyed. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the company never expected to be sued. By analogy to the instant Court's rationale, the insurer should have
been able to foresee a suit in Texas where it was doing business, and should have expected
to be liable for the amount of the policy.
108. See note 5 and accompanying text, supra; note 37 supra. The trial court described
Dick's stay in Mexico as a "sojourn". Dick v. Compania General Anglo-Mexicana de Seguros,
No. 39643 (Galveston County Dist. Ct., Texas, July 26, 1927).
109. See note 38 supra. For a criticism of the evaluation of the facts and the reasoning in
Dick, see Martin, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 185, 189
(1976) (any reliance by Home Insurance Co. was probably not detrimental).
110. I01 S. Ct. at 643.
111. See notes 37, 57 & 87 and accompanying text, supra. The rule that the lack of any
contacts or a mere insignificant contact of the forum with the controversy is not sufficient to
justify choice of the forum's law is still a valid standard. However, either that is not the
standard derived from Dick and Yates, or that standard has been erroneously applied in the
instant case.
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the full faith and credit clause and the due process clause.1 2 The full faith and
credit clause, however, is generally prescriptive rather than prohibitive in its
application. Moreover, the prescriptive utility of this clause was greatly diminished by the Watson Court's refusal to require mandatory use of the law of
the most interested state. 1 3 Consequently, the instant Court's approach can
probably best be evaluated using a due process rationale. The Court had used
standards similar to the significant aggregation test 1 4 in previous decisions, but
had reached opposite results based on forum contacts factually analogous to
the instant case. 1 5 Thus, the instant decision seemingly represents an expansion
of the constitutional boundaries within which a state must remain in choosing
to apply its own law. The forum contacts examined in the instant case are
relatively tenuous, and would appear to be the minimum contacts that due
process would demand. Consequently, the scope of the Court's expanded due
process approach and the future effect of the instant decision on choice of law
questions remain unclear., 6

The instant Court's reluctance to overturn a state's choice of law unless it
is arbitrary and unreasonable may impliedly signify that, absent some independent basis for finding application of a particular state's law unconstitutional, a forum's decision choice of law will be sustained. The Court's emphasis
on the state's concern for the public welfare may also mean that a forum always
has an important interest in the outcome of litigation involving one of its
citizens. The Court's new focus seems to lean toward preventing the use of a
state's law only if such use would have been completely unforeseen by the defendant. Rather, Allstate's expectations as to that particular obligation were
summarily disposed of by the Court. The instant decision, consequently, authorizes a new constitutional standard which condones what previous decisions
probably considered arbitrary and unreasonable. Such results are inconsistent
with the principles of fairness traditionally protected by the Supreme Court.

J. GARY Ross, JR.
112.

101 S. Ct. at 644.

113. See note 69 and accompanying text, supra.
114. See text accompanying note 75 supra. The Court has always been concerned with
the forum's interests in the controversy and with fairness to the parties. Only the extent of
the constitutional barrier to application of the forum's law has been changed. See note 94
supra.
115. See notes 28-39 and accompanying text, supra. The forum contacts in the Dick case
were really no more significant than those in the instant case.
116. The Court left open the possibility that even more attenuated contacts might be
sufficient to justify a forum's choice of its own law. 101 S. Ct. at 644 n.29. "We express no
view whether the first two contacts, either together or separately, would have sufficed...." Id.
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